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Introduction:
For 34 days in the summer of 2006, the world's attention was once again riveted on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. There, in Lebanon, a lovely country of cedar trees and sectarian strife, a bloody war erupted between Hezbollah and Israel.
It quickly became apparent that this was not the traditional war between Israel and an Arab state;
it was rather an asymmetrical war, the new prototype of Middle East conflict, between a state (Israel) and a militant, secretive, religiously fundamentalist sect or faction, such as, in the case of Lebanon, Hezbollah, the "Party of God," often referred to as a "state within a state," or, in the case of the Gaza strip, Hamas, the radical wing of the Palestinian movement that refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist as an independent nation.
New York Times columnist David Brooks has described these various groups in three ways: 1 as "subnational," like the Mahdi Army in Iraq; "supranational," like the unofficial alliances linking
Hezbollah and Hamas to Iran and Syria; or "transnational," like communication networks, such as the two Arabic-language newspapers published in London and distributed throughout the Arab world, and even more crucial to understanding this asymmetrical warfare, the two cable television networks:
1/ Al-Jazeera, the most popular TV network in the region broadcasting out of the Persian Gulf sheikdom of Qatar, and 2/ Al-Arabiya, the second most popular network, broadcasting out of nearby Dubai, another Persian Gulf sheikdom. Al-Jazeera brilliantly reflects and feeds the mood of the Arab streets, which is hostile to the West and Israel, while Al-Arabiya, financed by Saudi and Lebanese businessmen (a few with ties to the royal family in Saudi Arabia), advances a similar but more cautious agenda. In their coverage, both exploit the most sophisticated technology to carry their reports into the cafes and castles, huts and hamlets of the Middle East.
Also in this "transnational" world of media interconnectivity, at the very apex, stands the Internet, perhaps the most revolutionary technology in the modern world. During the summertime war in Lebanon, it helped produce the first really "live" war in history. True, during the first Gulf War of 1991, two American networks did broadcast one "live" report each from liberated Kuwait and during the second Gulf War of 2003, many networks did "live" broadcasts along the U.S. invasion route from Kuwait to Baghdad. But not until this war have networks actually projected in real time the grim reality of the battlefield-pictures of advancing or retreating Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, homes and villages being destroyed during bombing runs, old people wandering aimlessly through the debris, some tailed by children hugging tattered dolls, Israeli airplanes attacking Beirut airport, Hezbollah rockets striking northern Israel and Haifa, forcing 300,000 to evacuate their homes and move into underground shelters-all conveyed "live," as though the world had a front-row seat on the blood and gore of modern warfare.
To do their jobs, journalists employed both the camera and the computer, and, with the help of portable satellite dishes and video phones, "streamed" or broadcast their reports from hotel roofs and hilltops, as they covered the movement of troops and the rocketing of villages-often, (unintentionally, one assumes) revealing sensitive information to the enemy. Once upon a time, such information was the stuff of military intelligence acquired with considerable effort and risk; now it has become the stuff of everyday journalism. The camera and the computer have become weapons of war.
For any journalist worth his or her salt, this should spark a respectful moment of reflection. Not only did this new and awesome technology enable journalists to bring the ugly reality of war to both belligerents (and others around the world), serving as a powerful influence on public opinion and governmental attitudes and actions; it also became an extremely valuable intelligence asset for both Israel and Hezbollah, and Hezbollah especially exploited it.
If we are to collect lessons from this war, one of them would have to be that a closed society can control the image and the message that it wishes to convey to the rest of the world far more effectively than can an open society, especially one engaged in an existential struggle for survival.
An open society becomes the victim of its own openness. During the war, no Hezbollah secrets were disclosed, but in Israel secrets were leaked, rumors spread like wildfire, leaders felt obliged to issue hortatory appeals often based on incomplete knowledge, and journalists were driven by the fire of competition to publish and broadcast unsubstantiated information. A closed society conveys the impression of order and discipline; an open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality and rumor, criticism and revelation, conveys the impression of disorder, chaos and uncertainty, but this impression can be misleading.
It was hardly an accident that Hezbollah, in this circumstance, projected a very special narrative for the world beyond its kin-a narrative that depicted a selfless movement touched by God and blessed by a religious fervor and determination to resist the enemy, the infidel, and ultimately achieve a "divine victory," no matter the cost in life and treasure. The narrative contained no mention of Hezbollah's dependence upon Iran and Syria for a steady flow of arms and financial resources.
For Hezbollah, the 2006 summertime war was more than a battle against a mortal enemy; it was a crucial battle in a broader, ongoing war, linking religious fundamentalism to Arab nationalism. Will victory be defined as an open door to modernity or to a new caliphate? That is a key question. The whole Arab world is often framed as a "politically traumatized region," wrote Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland, caught in the "morbid interim between the dying of an exhausted political and social order and the birth of a still-unknown way of life." 2 Hezbollah saw itself as a resolute leader in shaping the Arab future.
Like Hamas and al-Qaeda, it appreciated the central importance of the communications revolution sweeping through the region. These three radical groups believe, according to Steve Fondacaro, an
American military expert, that it is on the "information battlefield" that the historic struggle between
Western modernity and Islamic fundamentalism will ultimately be resolved. "The new element of power that has emerged in the last thirty to forty years and has subsumed the rest is information," he said. "A revolution happened without us knowing or paying attention. Perception truly now is reality, and our enemies know it." 3 6 One Australian expert on counterinsurgency, now on loan to the State Department, Colonel David Kilcullen, agreed. "It's now fundamentally an information fight," he explained. When insurgents ambush an American convoy in Iraq, he said, "they are not doing that because they want to reduce the number of Humvees we have in Iraq by one. They're doing it because they want spectacular media footage of a burning Humvee." He then gave another example: "If bin Laden didn't have access to global media, satellite communications and the Internet, he'd just be a cranky guy in a cave." 4 Maybe, but in fact bin Laden does understand the enormous power of modern communications. Whenever he has a message for the world, he simply tapes it and gives it to AlJazeera. He knows it will be broadcast throughout the world. When bin Laden wanted to help tip the 2004 presidential election in the U.S. to the incumbent, George W. Bush, he criticized Bush in a taped message delivered to Al-Jazeera. In Washington, such an approach would be called "media manipulation," and it works there as it does in the Middle East.
Whether "sub," "supra" or "trans" this fusion of radical, revolutionary politics and ultramodern communications technology, as witnessed in the Lebanon War of 2006, has come to define the very nature of asymmetrical warfare. A key consequence of this new warfare is that the role of the journalist in many parts of the world has been dramatically transformed-from a quest for objectivity and fairness to an acceptance of advocacy as a tool of the craft. If once the journalist aspired to honest and detached reporting, now it has become increasingly acceptable for the journalist to be an activist player and a fiery advocate. 24/7 cable news has placed a premium on provocative chatter, not on substantive discourse. Many journalists in the Middle East, born into a culture of submissiveness to centralized authority, have always seen themselves as players and advocates, but this has not been the norm in Europe or the United States, and this change is both noteworthy and disturbing.
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The War: A graphic example of "disproportionality" popped up on television screens on July 30, when the Israelis bombed the Shiite village of Qana in southern Lebanon, and, according to early reports, 9 killed 54, 56 or 57 Lebanese civilians, mostly women and children. 11 Journalists rushed to the scene. One survivor was quoted as saying that there were "63 people from two families" hiding in the basement of the building that was hit and that then collapsed. A Lebanese government spokesman said that 54 people had been killed. A Human Rights Watch official on the scene said that actually 28 bodies had been found in the wreckage and another 22 had somehow escaped, leaving a number of others in the "unaccounted for" category. Most reporters used the higher of the two estimates, some describing the scene as a massacre. It made for more sensational copy.
Whether the accurate figure was 28 or 54, the attack was an unmitigated disaster. Many innocent people were killed. The Israelis apologized for the loss of life but explained that they were firing at a rocket site next to the building. The location of the rocket site put the Israelis in a difficult positionchoosing either not to destroy the rocket site or to destroy it but also run the risk of killing civilians and thereby earning a blast of international condemnation.
Everyone knew-or should have known-that in 1996, during an earlier 16-day war with Hezbollah, the Israelis had also struck Qana and hit a U.N. compound filled with refugees, killing 106 civilians. Then, too, there had been international condemnation of the "massacre," and then, too, Israel had apologized. Israelis to underground bomb shelters, where they lived for the better part of a month. 13 Hezbollah also threatened to hit Tel Aviv but never did, perhaps because Israel had destroyed its longer-range missiles in the first week of the war.
14 Towards the end of the conflict, as the devastation spread and casualties rose, there was a chorus of calls for a ceasefire. The United States, for a time, stalled, apparently hoping that with each day and week of deliberate delay Israel could finally succeed in defeating Hezbollah. But in this regard Israel failed, and Hezbollah prevailed. It was often said during the Vietnam War that if the guerrillas did not lose, they had won; and if the U.S. did not win, it had lost. During the Lebanon war, neither side lost, nor won. Led by the U.S. and France, the U.N. finally agreed on the terms of a ceasefire. 15 One condition was that Hezbollah had to disarm, and military shipments from Iran and Syria had to stop. Yet Hezbollah did not disarm; it proclaimed that it had achieved a "divine victory"
and after a few months it even made a dramatic bid for absolute political power in Lebanon, trying to drive its political opponents from office. Nasrallah also boasted that Hezbollah still had 20,000
rockets and missiles in its hidden arsenal. 16 After every war, like somber drumbeats rolling across the field of battle, casualties are counted and bodies buried. In this war, Lebanese casualties were much higher than Israeli casualties, but both sides suffered grievously from a war that seemed especially cruel and long. 18 Hezbollah provided no official estimates of its own losses, but Israel figured that it had killed 500-600 guerrilla fighters.
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Coverage:
"Disproportionality:"
No theme resonated through the coverage of the Lebanese war more forcefully than the repeated assertion by Arab and Western reporters that Israel responded "disproportionately" to Hezbollah's initial provocation. Though eight soldiers had been killed and two captured, it was said that the provocation was similar in style to others that took place over the years, both sides expecting the U.N. or the U.S. to intervene and negotiate first a ceasefire and then a prisoner swap, and that the Israeli response thus seemed wildly out of kilter-and, therefore, "disproportionate." Whether it was first the media focusing on this theme and then Hezbollah exploiting its propaganda value, or whether it was Hezbollah deliberately drawing journalists to this story day after day (though given the almost daily damage, this was hardly necessary, since journalists would have focused on it anyway) there appears to be little doubt that the media everywhere emphasized the theme of "disproportionality" from the opening day of the conflict, as though nothing else measured up to it in importance.
The theme was obvious in most of the reporting. Let us engage for a moment in what scholars call "content analysis." Look at the headlines, the photographs and the television reports, measure the time devoted to them on television and the space set aside for them in newspapers, check the nationality of the "victims" (sometimes referred to as "martyrs" by Arab reporters)-and you are quickly able to spot the media's approach in covering this war. Was it, as Fox President Roger Ailes might ask, "fair and balanced?" Or, was it tilted or biased in one direction or another?
Asharq Al-Awsat is one of the two Arabic-language newspapers published in London and then distributed throughout the Middle East. From July 13 to August 16, the paper ran 24 photographs related to the war on the front page; all but two of them showed the death and destruction in Lebanon caused by Israeli attacks. 20 The Arab reader of this paper could have drawn only one conclusion- On the front pages of The New York Times and The Washington Post, Israel was portrayed as the aggressor nearly twice as often in the headlines and exactly three times as often in the photos, according to another Shorenstein Center survey. 27 Although neither The Times nor The Post stressed the theme of "disproportionality" on their front pages, both made frequent references to it in their stories, analyses and editorial columns.
Another major theme in the coverage of the Lebanon war had to do with traditional Arab feelings of "victimization." Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya hit this theme frequently. Al-Arabiya, for example, stressed Lebanese victimization in 95 percent of its stories, according to Media Tenor. 28 In other words, the viewer could not escape the belief that Israel was the aggressor and the Lebanese were the victims. Al-Jazeera, though, hit this theme in 70 percent of its broadcasts about Lebanon, a high percentage but still 25 percent less than Al-Arabiya, which coincidentally meant Al-Jazeera was emphasizing this theme with the same frequency as the four top television programs in Germany. 29 Most television networks around the world ran many more stories from Lebanon than from Israel, and the stories all focused on Lebanese deaths, destruction and devastation, which led to the obvious conclusion: in this war, as in other Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Arabs were portrayed as the victims.
On the other side of the coin of victimization is said to be an equally strong Arab feeling of humiliation, which often finds its expression in the question: how come Israel consistently defeats the Israeli units came under severe Hezbollah attack. It is impossible for outsiders to know whether Hezbollah used the information provided by UNIFIL, which was available to anyone with a laptop, or whether Hezbollah depended primarily upon information provided by loyal local supporters.
However, no UNIFIL posting during the war contained any specific information relating to Hezbollah's military movements, perhaps because they were not visible to UNIFIL or perhaps because UNIFIL did not choose to see the movements. 34 Either way, Hezbollah, fighting an asymmetrical war, could easily have benefited from UNIFIL's web postings; indeed, it would have been foolish for them not to accept UNIFIL's gift.
Israel, a democracy caught in such a guerrilla-style war, found itself unable to benefit from the daily postings, because they contained no useful intelligence about Hezbollah's movements.
Access:
Reporters always complain about access, specifically in this war they complained about not having had enough access to the battlefield. Their complaints were directed primarily at Israel, which tried to accommodate the needs of hundreds of foreign correspondents attempting to cover the conflict. Complaints were rarely directed at Hezbollah, which controlled media access with a bookkeeper's rigidity. Once, Hezbollah conducted a media tour of a southern suburb of Beirut inhabited by Shiite supporters whose homes and apartments had been badly damaged during Israeli air strikes. 35 The point was to again use the media as a weapon in the propaganda war for public approval, and the media did not mind being used, though they were forced to pay a price. Foreign correspondents were warned, on entry to the tour, that they could not wander off on their own or ask questions of any of the residents. They could only take pictures of sites approved by their Hezbollah minders. Violations, they were told, would be treated harshly. Cameras would be confiscated, film or tape destroyed, and offending reporters would never again be allowed access to Hezbollah officials or Hezbollah-controlled areas.
So far as we know, of all the reporters taken on this guided tour, reminiscent of the Soviet era, only CNN's Anderson Cooper described the rigid ground rules for what they were-an attempt to create and control a story. 36 And Hezbollah succeeded. All of the other reporters followed the Hezbollah script: Israel, in a cruel, heartless display of power, bombed innocent civilians. Casualties were high. Devastation was everywhere. So spoke the Hezbollah spokesman; so wrote many in the foreign press corps. At one point, apparently on cue, a Hezbollah minder signaled for ambulances to rev up their engines, set off their sirens and drive noisily down the street. The scene was orchestrated, designed to provide a photo op, and reporters went along for the ride. It was for them a rare look "inside" Hezbollah. For Hezbollah, it was another successful play to the gallery.
But, on any given day, reporters and cameramen in Beirut went off on their own with no official chaperones. They hired cars and rode long rutted roads toward southern Lebanon. The main road was pocked by bomb craters, bridges blown away and craters so wide and deep they looked like lakes. Many of the small, picturesque villages, bombed and shelled by the Israelis, still served as Hezbollah strongholds. The cameramen didn't need Hezbollah's permission to film the devastation, but if in the wreckage they saw young men with guns, they were warned not to take pictures of these Hezbollah fighters, else their cameras would be confiscated and they might run into trouble returning to Beirut-an indirect warning, which most reporters took seriously. Even without these pictures, though, reporters still had a good story-old men and women caring for young children and surviving in the grimy grit of war, as Israeli tanks and troops snaked their way through the countryside. Throughout the conflict, the rarest picture of all was that of a Hezbollah guerrilla. It was as if the war on the Hezbollah side was being fought by ghosts.
Only Kevin Sites, who calls himself a "sojo," or solo journalist, claimed to have no trouble getting through to Hezbollah fighters, though he provided evidence of getting through to only one. 37 His reports appeared on a pioneering Yahoo! News website called "Kevin Sites in the Hot Zone," where he filed more than 100 pieces from various war zones. In a July 28 piece, Sites reported from a small village north of Tyre, where he met "Hussein" in his home. The interview was arranged by a "source," who presumably served as an interpreter. "Hussein" was "polite" and "resolute" and after a while pulled from his bedroom closet "an American-made M-16 assault rifle," "a rocket-propelled grenade launcher" and a "green shoulder harness full of ammunition clips." "Hussein" was said to be waiting for a "call south" but in the meantime was "looking for Israeli spies." "Sojo"-style journalism places a supreme priority on the professional integrity of the reporter, who travels alone and files his or her reports using a backpack of digital technology.
Anthony Shadid, an Arabic-speaking reporter for The Washington Post, drove one day to the Litani River, where he came upon the unusual scene of a score of men pushing and pulling two trucks laden with supplies. 38 "Don't take pictures," one of the men shouted. Another told Shadid, "We're not scared of anything but God," and he pointed to the sky. "There's God. God is above the airplanes." He meant the Israeli bombers. A Lebanese Red Cross official reminded Shadid, "It's forbidden to take pictures." Shadid wanted to know if these men were Hezbollah fighters. The official nodded. Clearly, none of the men wanted to talk to Shadid. One pulled his black t-shirt over his face. Another put his left hand over his mouth.
Not so, on the Israeli side of the war, where officials made a clumsy effort to control and contain the coverage but essentially failed. Hour after hour, day after day, newspapermen and anchormen found many ways to avoid Israeli censorship or obstruction-and cover the war, which was their job.
Newspaper copy from all over the world was studded with frequent references to interviews with Israeli troops, generals and ministers. Jonathan Finer, a reporter for The Washington Post, had no trouble interviewing, by his count, two dozen Israeli soldiers "at army bases, hotels, artillery batteries and staging points for their entry into Lebanon since the heaviest ground fighting began last week." 39 Several soldiers expressed surprise that it was taking them so long to defeat Hezbollah. One was quoted as saying, "Most of the time we only see them when they want to draw attention to themselves, then they kick us from behind." Finer also interviewed an Israeli general, who gave an on-the-record assessment of Hezbollah's anti-tank missiles. Finer's experience covering the war on the Israeli side was not uncommon.
Network anchors, representing cable TV operations from Al-Jazeera to Fox, set up their cameras along the Israeli-Lebanese border, like birds on a clothes line, one next to another, so they could do live and frequent reports from the battlefield. Even in the dead of night, the anchors, using special cameras, were in a position to observe Israeli tanks and troops preparing to cross the border into shouldn't be telling this), and getting right up there, up front, you see stuff that can't be censored, that can't be filtered." 43 Walid Omary, Jerusalem bureau chief for Al-Jazeera, described how Israeli police followed his television crews and accused them of "giving information to the enemy," and yet he deployed three television crews to Al-Jazeera's daily coverage of the Israeli side of the war-"one 20 in Haifa and one on the border and a third in Jerusalem." They filed two long television stories every day-"one about the people, the civilians, and the other about the political and military activities." 44 
Live-"Broadcast via Broadband":
Using an appealing, alliterative phrase, Al-Arabiya's director of news and current affairs, Emile Nakhle, defined live coverage of the Lebanon war in a way most TV producers would appreciate.
"We introduced," he explained, "broadcast via broadband. In places not accessible by car, in the middle of conflict areas for example, a sole reporter with a laptop and small camera can shoot, edit, feed and do live interviews." Well-organized, angry and self-righteous pro-Hezbollah and pro-Israeli blogs sent millions of messages throughout the war, simply overwhelming the media with criticism of copy that did not reflect their version of reality. The effect was nonstop pressure on journalists to look over their shoulders-to conform either to extremes on both sides or to stick to the middle of public opinion.
If "disproportionality" was the theme of the day, most reporters would try to do stories supporting or rejecting the theme but always keeping it in play. It was easier and safer to be in step with the public than to be walking into the wind.
Hezbollah, as we know, understood "the information battlefield." It was sophisticated about its nooks and crannies. For example, Newsweek reported that one photograph of a "rescue worker
holding up what appears to be the corpse of a child whose body is nothing but tatters of flesh below the waist" was so gruesome that the American media refused to publish it. 50 But Hezbollah, with no such inhibitions, ran the photograph on its satellite television station and then e-mailed it around the globe. 51 Hezbollah focused on Lebanese victims, rarely mentioned its own casualties, and accused
Israel of aggression. Two value systems were clearly in collision: one didn't go with the gruesome photo, one did go with it, in fact deliberately spread it far and wide, wanting nothing more than to use any and every weapon of "information" to defeat Israel.
There was also the case of two other photographs shot and later altered by freelancer Adnan Hajj, who covered the war for Reuters until August 7, when he was fired. To wash its hands of Hajj,
Reuters then quickly removed all 920 of his photographs from its database. 52 One of the two photographs showed a suburb of Beirut after an Israeli air attack. Dark smoke rose from a devastated building. It was an arresting photograph that caught the horror of war, and naturally it appeared in newspapers around the world. Were it not for an American blog site called Little Green Footballs, run by Charles Johnson, it might have won a prize for wartime photography. But with determination and ingenuity, Johnson found that the photograph had almost certainly been doctored. He compared it with others shot of the same building at the same time and discovered that in Hajj's photograph the dark smoke was darker-and there was more of it. 53 The other Hajj photograph of an Israeli jet streaking across southern Lebanon showed three flares being dropped from the plane. Upon later examination, it was learned that only one had been dropped. 54 Twice Hajj had altered photographs, not presumably to contrive events where none existed but rather to heighten the drama of real events ("to hype the story," an old journalistic sin) and perhaps deliberately to worsen Israel's image in the world and, by comparison, to soften Hezbollah's image.
Hajj denied that he had wittingly doctored the two photographs, saying he was simply trying to remove dust marks in poor lighting. 55 We may never know the absolute truth, but Hajj's photographs served to heighten doubts about journalistic credibility. "Fauxtography," they were called. Johnson (and many others in the West) thought the incident proved that Hezbollah would exploit any advantage to win the war of images-in its strategy, as crucial an element as winning the war itself.
Ravi Nessman of the Associated Press said that photo editors were examining "hundreds and possibly thousands of photos a day," looking for the perfect representation of the ravages of war and always asking themselves: are these photos real, are they doctored, are they fake? "There is a lot of anger over the photos," Nesssman added. 56 There was a lot of professional embarrassment, too. Salem Daher, described as "a Lebanese civil rescue worker" was shown in German newspapers and television in late July carrying the body of a dead boy from one location to another so that, it was said, different groups of cameramen could shoot the scene. Once he was shown reloading a body into an ambulance so they could get a better shot.
Cameramen dubbed him "The Green Helmet," because he was always wearing a green helmet and always enthusiastically steering them to better pictures of Lebanese casualties. photographed by Hajj) that had been largely leveled by Israeli air strikes. Jerusalem bureau chief Stephen Erlanger was upset by the publication of the photo, because it lacked context. He told the Mideast Press Club that it "bothered me a great deal. We did a satellite photo of southern Beirut, of Dahia, which was quite destroyed and we didn't print near it a larger photo of the rest of Beirut, which I think was a failure to provide context." He meant "the rest of Beirut," which was essentially undamaged. 58 On another day, The Times ran a photograph of a Lebanese man in Tyre being rescued from the rubble of a building bombed by the Israelis. The caption read: "The mayor of Tyre said that in the worst hit areas, bodies were still buried under the rubble, and he appealed to the Israelis to allow government authorities time to pull them out." 59 On August 9, The Times ran a correction after bloggers noticed that the same rescued man, looking clean and composed, was seen in other photographs shot after the Israeli raid. Was it a staged photo? Was it the same Lebanese man?
Rarely did the media use photographs to show that Hezbollah fired its weapons from residential neighborhoods in clear violation of international law. This was rare, because Hezbollah did not allow reporters to film such military activity. Yet, on July 30, the Sunday Herald Sun in Australia did just that. 60 It published photos that, in its own words, "damn Hezbollah" for conducting military operations in populated suburbs. In one photo of a "high density residential area," Hezbollah was shown preparing launch pads for "rockets and heavy-caliber weapons." In another men were firing an anti-aircraft gun "meters from an apartment block" where laundry was drying on a balcony. The newspaper said that the photos were "exclusive," shot by a "visiting journalist and smuggled out by a friend." The photos had to be smuggled out of Beirut, because Hezbollah would never have allowed them to be shot-they proved that Hezbollah was in fact conducting military operations from heavily populated Beirut suburbs, which was considered a war crime.
It might have been on that day that Al-Jazeera's Beirut correspondent, Katja Nasr, was doing a live feed of an Israeli missile strike near a funeral procession. In her report, no Hezbollah fighters appeared. "The people were taking part in a funeral procession for the martyrs that fell from Israeli airstrikes yesterday on a residential building," she reported, using the loaded word "martyrs" for those killed in the Israeli attack. Many Arab reporters used the same word; no Western reporter ever did, except on occasion to define its meaning. "More than 30 people were killed, one-third of them children. Entire families were killed in the strike, including a mother and her two children, a family of six." Men carried coffins wrapped in the red, green and white flag of Lebanon. Nasr's was a powerful report, accurate but incomplete, slanted but true. 61 Balancing photographs for fairness may be one of the most difficult jobs in contemporary journalism, assuming a professional desire to be responsible. "Photos are trickier than words," said Keller of the Times said that the issue is so irresolvable that he refuses to pander to the prejudices of his critics. "They don't want you to be balanced in your coverage; they want you to portray the morality of the war as they see it." 65 Scholars have coined a term for this problem-it's called "hostile media effect," meaning partisans tend to believe that the media generally paints them in a negative light. In one experiment, researchers showed 144 informed television viewers six news segments about the 1982 Israel-Lebanon war. Viewers with a pro-Arab sentiment thought they saw 42 pro-Israeli references and 26 anti-Israeli references. Viewers with a pro-Israeli sentiment, watching the same news clips, thought they saw 16 pro-Israeli references and 57 anti-Israeli references. Both sides were positive they were right.
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Conclusion:
On Al-Jazeera and other Arab media, the Lebanon war was often referred to as "the Sixth War." Jenin on the West Bank, the answer is no. "Objectivity and balance do not exist in the Middle East and in this region especially," he said. 69 With degrees from Hebrew and Tel Aviv universities,
Omary is an accomplished journalist, who rose to become Jerusalem bureau chief for Al-Jazeera.
"My village was under the attack of missiles from Lebanon and my relatives were under attack from the Israelis in Lebanon, which means, to give good balance, to try to give good coverage-is not easy 28 at all in this area." 70 Omary added a personal dimension to the chronic Arab predisposition to see of 24/7 cable news, call-in radio and television programs, Internet bloggers and online websites, cell phones and iPods. The upshot is a new kind of populist journalism, which strongly influences the story that is being covered. Indeed, the journalist or, in this new age, the commentator, often becomes part of the story.
During the Lebanon War, for example, the bloggers had more influence over the flow of the story than they had had during any other war. Ravi Nessman, the senior Jerusalem correspondent of the Associated Press, thought the influence of the bloggers, especially in the United States, was "unprecedented." 75 When the bloggers [in the U.S.] discovered that photographs had been doctored, "the credibility of the bloggers…skyrocketed and our credibility plummeted." Nessman added,
"After that everything that we did was suspect. And that makes it very difficult to cover a war, to have honest people who are trying, who are not doctoring photographs, who are not taking one side 30 or the other, but who are trying to present the truth of what is going on there, and have everything we say be examined, which is fair, but basically be questioned as a lie, and starting with that premise that the media is lying."
The Lebanon War produced a bumper crop of stories both good and bad, growing out of a new kind of asymmetrical warfare waged by a state on the one side and a religious, nationalistic guerrilla force on the other side. Will Israel seek to change the ground rules for coverage of the next war?
And even if the effort were made, could it succeed? In an open society, ground rules may be announced, but they are not likely to be observed or enforced. During the 2006 summertime war in the Middle East, it was Israel versus Hezbollah, led by the charismatic Hassan Nasrallah, and because Israel did not win the war, it is judged to have lost. In Iraq, in the not too distant future, it may well be the United States versus the Mahdi Army, led by the equally charismatic Sheik Moqtada al-Sadr.
The challenge for responsible journalists covering asymmetrical warfare, especially in this age of the Internet, is new, awesome and frightening.
